Battle of Waterloo

The Battle of Waterloo by Clément-Auguste Andrieux

Prelude

Napoleon returned from exile on the Island of Elba on March 1, 1815. On March 19, 1815, King Louis XVIII fled Paris and Napoleon entered Paris the following day. Meanwhile, far from recognizing Napoleon as Emperor of France, the great powers of the Congress of Vienna (Austria, Russia, Prussia, the United Kingdom) and their allies declared Napoleon an outlaw, and with the signing of the declaration on March 13, 1815, the War of the Seventh Coalition began. With the war, Napoleon's hopes for peace were dashed.

Another treaty (the Treaty of Alliance against Napoleon) was ratified on March 25, and each of the Great Powers agreed to commit troops for the coming conflict. But Britain's troop capacity was weaker than that of other countries and its army was scattered all over the world. Britain made up for this deficit by paying subsidies to other countries.

Some time after the Allied mobilization, it was decided to start the planned invasion of France on July 1, 1815, later than both Blücher and Wellington wanted. This was because both armies had been ready for the Austrians and Russians in June. The advantage of this later invasion date was that it gave all the Coalition armies a chance to be ready at the same time. This would allow the outnumbered Coalition army to gain the upper hand against Napoleon's outnumbered armies. But the late start of the war would also give Napoleon time to prepare and strengthen.

In this situation, Napoleon now had to decide whether to defend or attack. Defense would require a repeat of the 18141 campaign in France. The main French cities of Paris and Lyon would be fortified and two armies would be deployed, a large one in front of Paris and a small one in front of Lyon. Guerrilla warfare would be waged against the coalition armies.

But Napoleon chose to attack, which meant a pre-emptive strike before the Coalition armies could regroup and cooperate. Napoleon thought that by destroying some of the larger Coalition armies, he could force the Coalition states to the peace table. If his request for peace was rejected by the Coalition armies, he intended to defeat the other Coalition armies.

Napoleon's decision to attack Belgium was supported by several considerations. First, he learned that the British and Prussian armies were too disorganized and could be defeated. The other great coalition armies, Russia and Austria, would not be able to reinforce Prussia and the British. This was because the Russian army was still on the move in Europe and the Austrian army was mobilized. In addition, the British troops in Belgium were largely inferior soldiers. A large part of the British army had been sent to America. In addition, the combined Dutch army was reinforcing the British. The Dutch troops lacked experience and equipment. On top of all this, a French victory could have triggered a French-backed revolution in Belgium.

Napoleon's Plan of Action

When Napoleon decided to attack the Coalition forces in what is now Belgium, he was faced with a variety of strategies, and while the Coalition forces knew they would be attacked, they were unsure of Napoleon's timing. Thanks to his spies, Napoleon knew how widely spread the Coalition forces were in the Low Countries. His only chance of success was to move quickly and win overwhelming victories.

In a meeting with his generals, Napoleon argued that he should not attack between the Moselle and Meuse rivers, as this route would allow Wellington to join Blücher undisturbed; nor should he attack between the Sambre and Scheldt rivers, as this would allow Blücher to join Wellington. Likewise, he did not think it was right to go down the Meuse and attack the city of Namur.

Napoleon decided to attack between the Sambre and the Meuse Rivers and destroy the divisions that tried to intervene and block his advance. Once he had the advantage, he intended to maneuver quickly inland and defeat each army separately, without combining their forces.

Napoleon had chosen as his main line of operations the direct road to Brussels via Charlerio, where Wellington's left flank and Blücher's right flank were based. Since the Prussian front line covered Charleroi and the French territory just south of Charleroi, and the Anglo-Allied outpost was at Frasnes-lez-Gosselies, further along the Charleroi-Brussels road, he planned to first overcome the Prussian army and then attack the Anglo-Allied troops before they could be properly deployed.

Napoleon's grand aim was to prevent the two armies from uniting and destroy them both; to settle in Brussels; to reunite the country with the French Empire by revolting the Belgian population in his favor; to remove Belgian soldiers from Dutch service; to deter the invading armies from crossing the Rhine; perhaps to enter into negotiations; and, most important of all, to buy time to gather reinforcements from France.

Start of Operation

French Army Advance in the North

The French V Corps left Metz on June 6 with orders to reach Philippeville on June 14. The Imperial Guard began its march from Paris on June 8 and reached Avesnes on June 13. The VI Corps from Laon, the I Corps from Lille, the II Corps from Valenciennes and the III Corps from Mezieres also arrived in Maubeyge and Avesnes on June 13. The IV Reserve Cavalry Corps was concentrated at Sombre.

The fact that the various corps converged on the same day and at almost the same time demonstrated Napoleon's mobility skills. The next day, the French encamped at three different points. The left wing, consisting of I Corps and II Corps and numbering approximately 44,000 men, was stationed at Solre-sur-Sambre, on the right bank of the Sambre. III Corps and VI Corps, with about 60,000 troops of the Imperial Guard and Cavalry Reserves, were headquartered at Beaumont. The right wing, consisting of IV Corps and a heavy cavalry division, totaling 16,000 men, was in front of Philippeville.

France's Deception of Coalition Intelligence

Napoleon had effectively concealed the movement of several corps and their concentration on the right bank of the Sambre by strengthening his forward positions and by exercising equal vigilance and activity along the entire line of the Belgian frontier.

On the night of June 13, however, the beam of light that the French fires projected into the sky was noticed by the observation posts of the Prussian I Corps. The Prussians realized that these fires were in the direction of Walcourt and Beaumont and also in the vicinity of Solre-sur-Sambre.

Other reports from spies and deserters said that Napoleon was expected to join the French army that evening; that the Imperial Guard and II Corps had reached Avesnes-sur-Helpe and Maubeuge, and that at 13:00 four French battalions had crossed the river at Solre-sur-Sambre and occupied Merbes-le-Chateau, and that the French attack would take place on June 14 or 15.

First News of the French Gathering

On June 14, Major-General van Merlen, a Belgian-Dutch major-general commanding the outposts forming the Prussian far right between Saint-Symphorien and Binche near Mons, found that French troops had been moved by Beaumont from Maubeuge and its vicinity towards Philippeville. Moreover, apart from a picket at Bettignies and some National Guardsmen in other villages, there were no more enemy forces on his front. He passed this important information to General Steinmetz of Prussia on his left, with whom he was in constant communication. Steinmetz in turn sent this information to General Zieten in Charleroi.

Prussian General Pirch de Zieten, whose II Brigade was on Steinmetz's left, informed him that he had received information through his outposts that the French army was massing around Beaumont and Merbes-le-Chateau. He reported that their army numbered 150,000 men and was commanded by General Vandamme, Prince Jerome Bonaparte and other officers, that crossing the frontier had been forbidden by the French since the previous day and that a French patrol had been seen that day near Biercee, not far from Thuin.

Throughout the day, the Prussian I Corps troops received frequent reports from peasants looking for a safe place for their livestock. Their accounts confirmed that Napoleon and his brother Jerome had arrived.

Zieten quickly passed this information to Prince Blücher and the Duke of Wellington. This information was consistent with information received from Major General Dörnberg, who was serving as an observer in Mons, and, as already mentioned, from General van Merlen, who commanded the outposts between Mons and Binche.

But nothing was known for certain about the actual French concentration point, the likely French strength or Napoleon's planned offensive movements. The two Coalition commanders therefore refrained from changing their positions and waited for more detailed intelligence.

Blücher Gathers His Army

Zieten's troops were held under arms overnight and assembled by battalions at their assembly points. Later in the day Zieten's outposts reported that French columns were massing on his front. This indicated an attack the following morning, and this intelligence reached Blücher between 21:00 and 22:00 on June 14.

Orders for the march of II Corps from Namur to Sombreffe and III Corps from Ciney to Namue were sent at 23:00. Earlier that day, Bülow in Liege had received an order ordering him to prepare his corps for Hannut in a single march, and at midnight he was ordered to assemble his troops in the cantonments around Hannut.

Zieten was tasked with waiting for the French advance from his position on the Sambre River. If he had to retreat, he was to retreat as slowly as possible in the direction of Fleurus to allow time for the other three Prussian corps to regroup.

Coalition Uncertainty Over Napoleon's Main Line of Attack

This plan, together with the vigilance exercised along the outposts of both the British allies and Prussian outposts, would provide Wellington and Blücher with the greatest insight into Napoleon's dispositions immediately prior to an attack.

Blücher and Welllington were aware that significant French troops had moved from their right and were massing in front of Charleroi. Although they were aware that French troops beyond Tournai, Mons and Binche were moving, this could have been intended to draw the British allied army towards Charleroi. If so, the French would launch a false attack, with the real attack coming from Mons.

Wellington made no changes to the organization of his forces, but Blücher ordered his army to assemble immediately at Sombreffe. This would allow them to advance through Charleroi, should that be the real line of attack, and at the same time be on a road along which they could move quickly to support Wellington should he be attacked on the road to Mons.

Zieten's Movements

Zieten's position and outposts stretched from Bonne-Esperance to Lobbes and Thuin on the Sambre, to Dinant on the Meuse via Gerpinnes and Sosoye. The right brigade was headquartered at Fontaine L'Eveque and held the area between Binche and Sambre. The center brigade stretched along the Sambre, occupying Marchienne-au-Pont, Dampremy, Roux, Charleroi, Gilly and Chatelet. Part of the III brigade, under Jagow, held Farciennes and Tamines on the Sambre, while the rest was on guard between Fleurus and the Sambre. The left brigade was also extended along the river almost to Namur. I Corps' reserve cavalry had been moved further forward and was in the cantonment around Pieton, with its rally point at Gosselies.

Zieten did not feel the need to make any changes to his deployment and waited for the expected attack on June 15.

De Bourmont Abandons Napoleon

While Napoleon was busy organizing his planned attack, he received a message from Count Gerard informing him that Lieutenant General de Bourmont of the IV Corps and Colonels Clouet and Villoutreys had deserted to the Coalition. This desertion caused Napoleon to make some changes in his plans.

Advance of the French Army

In the early morning of June 15, the French army marched in three columns from the three camps established the previous night towards Sambre. The left column marched from Solrsur-Sambre via Thuin to Marchienne-au-Pont, the center from Beaumont via Ham-sur-Heure to Charleroi, and the right column from Philippeville via Gerpinnes to Chatelet.

Start of Conflicts

At around 3:30 a.m., the head of the left column made contact with Prussian troops in front of Lobbes and fired on the sentries of the 2nd Battalion of the Westphalian Landwehr 1st Regiment under Captain von Gillhausen, driving them in. This officer was aware that French troops had massed in large force on his front the night before and planned to attack him in the morning. He had carefully positioned his battalion to take full advantage of the hilly and intersecting terrain he occupied. However, the French leaned more to their right and joined other troops advancing along the Thuin road to his left. They soon drove back an advanced cavalry column and at 0430 hours began firing on the outpost at Maladrie, 1 mile (1.6km) in front of Thuin.

This shot announced the start of the French offensive and was heard by the Prussian troops forming the left wing of Steinmetz's brigade. However, the sound did not travel through the extremely dense and heavy air, and so for some time most of the brigade's right wing was unaware of the French advance.

Shots were clearly heard from Charleroi. In his reports to Blücher and Wellington on June 14, Zieten not only said that he was ready to attack, but also that fighting had begun. Shortly before 05:00, Zieten sent Courier Jager to his headquarters in Namur and Brussels, informing them that he had heard some artillery fire on his front since 04:30 but had not yet received any reports from the outposts. In addition, he told Blücher to order the entire Corps to withdraw and to assemble at Fleurus if necessary.

Zieten's report to Wellington reached Brussels at 09:00, while the report to Blücher reached Namur at around 08:00 on June 15. It should be noted that there are doubts about Zieten's sending a report to Wellington at such an early hour. Muffing, the Prussian intelligence officer assigned to Wellington, only mentions in his memoirs a message sent between 8 and 9 a.m. that reached him around 5 p.m. Wellington's statement that he received news from Charleroi at 9 a.m. probably meant that it was news about the situation at 9 a.m., rather than news that arrived at 9 a.m. Although Wellington did not take any precautions against this situation, Blücher took precautions by ordering several of his corps to assemble at Sombreffe.

Before 10:00 a.m. on June 15, an order was sent from Prussian headquarters to III Corps to resume its march towards Sombreffe on the morning of June 16 after resting overnight at Namur.

At 11:30 a.m. a message was sent to Bülow reporting the French advance and requesting that IV Corps, after resting at Hannut, resume its march towards Gembloux at dawn on June 16 at the latest.

French Capture Thuin and Cross the Sambre as Prussian Outposts Are Driven Inland

Meanwhile, the Prussian I Corps engaged the advancing enemy. The Prussian troops at Maladrie held their ground for a while, holding the French advance on Thuin in check. But they were eventually defeated and driven back to Thuin.

Thuin was occupied by the III Battalion of the II Westphalian Landwehr under Major von Monsterberg. Around 07:00 they were forced to retreat to Montigny-le-Tilleul. The French managed to take this village as well. The retreat continued towards Marchienne-au-Pont, led by Woisky's cavalry. But before they reached Marchienne-au-Pont, the Prussians were attacked by French cavalry. The French attack was devastating for the retreating Prussians, especially as many of their infantry were killed or captured. During this retreat, the III Battalion of the II Westphalian Landwerh suffered such heavy casualties that there was no battalion left. Lieutenant Colonel von Woisky was wounded but remained at the head of his cavalry.

Captain von Gillhausen commanded the Prussian battalion stationed at Lobbes, and as soon as he realized that Thuin had been taken, he organized the retreat. After a while he withdrew his pickets and occupied the bridge over the Sambre with one company. He then continued his retreat and occupied the forest of Sart-de-Lobbes near Lobbes. When the position at Hourpes was also captured by the French, he was ordered to continue his retreat, taking a route between Fontaine-l'Evaque and Anderlues.

Aulne Abbey and a nearby Prussian outpost, occupied by Battalion III of the First Westphalian Landwehr under the temporary command of Captain Grollmann, also fell to the French. Hourpes, close to the Abbey, also fell to the French around the same time. The lack of movement reports for the capture of these two outposts could mean that the Westphalians abandoned them before they were occupied.

Withdrawal of Zieten's Troops

As soon as General Steinmetz, the commander of the Prussian I Brigade, realized that the French were advancing along the Sambre towards their most advanced positions, he sent one of his staff officers, Major Arnauld, to General van Merlen at Saint-Symphorien to inform him of what had happened and that he was withdrawing. On the way, Major Arnauld ordered Major Engelhardt, who commanded the outposts on the right flank, to withdraw his pickets immediately, and when he reached Binche he was informed that the French had attacked and that the brigade's left flank was engaged in hot fighting. Until the arrival of Major Arnauld, the Prussian troops in this area were completely unaware of the attack as they had heard no firing. Now the right column had to withdraw as quickly as possible. They had to cover more ground than the rest of the brigade, but it was still the last to withdraw.

At around 08:00 Zieten, believing that the entire French army was on the move and that the direction of advance was Charleroi and its environs, gave new orders to his brigades.

The first was to withdraw to the position behind Gosselies by Courcelles. Secondly, Brigade II was to defend the three bridges over the Sambre at Marchienne-au-Pont, Charleroi and Chatelet, thus allowing Brigade I to fall back towards Gosselies. The III and IV Brigades and the reserve cavalry and artillery units were to be assembled as quickly as possible and deployed behind Fleurus.

The three points of retreat for the First Brigade were Mont-Sainte-Aldegonde for the troops on the right, Anderlues for those in the center and Fontaine-l'Eveque for those on the left. In order to reach these three points simultaneously, Zieten ordered those in front of Fontaine-l'Eveque to move as slowly as possible to avoid a French attack.

Reaching the line at around 10:00, the brigade began to retreat towards Courcelles. The brigade's left was protected by the I Regiment of the Westphalian Landwehr and a separate column under Colonel Hoffmann.

At Marchienne-au-Pont stood the II Battalion of the Prussian VI Regiment, attached to the II Brigade of Zieten's Corps. The bridge was barricaded and, with the help of two cannon, the Prussians pushed the French back and began to retreat through Dampremy towards Gilly. In this area were three companies of Battalion I of Regiment II of the Westphalian Landwehr with four guns. These also retreated towards Gilly at the same time. The guns provided cover for the retreating troops with fire from the churchyard.

Clash in Couillet

The light cavalry of the I Cavalry Reserve Corps (Lieutenant General Pajol) formed the forward guard of the central column of the French army. Vandamme was supposed to be supported by the Infantry Corps, but due to a mistake Vandamme did not receive his orders and was unable to leave his camp at 06:00. Realizing the mistake, Napoleon immediately moved the Imperial Guard forward to support Pajol. As Pajol advanced, the Prussian outposts were forced back. At Couillet on the Sambre River, about 1.5 miles (2.4km) below Charleroi, French cavalry attacked a company of the III Battalion of the Prussian 28th Regiment and forced their surrender.

French Capture of Charleroi

Soon after, the French captured Marcinelle, close to Charleroi. The embankments, both connected to a bridge by hedges of about 750 meters, caused the Prussians to push back the French cavalry. Part of the village was retaken by the Prussians and they made an attempt to destroy the bridge. The French were then able to break through the embankments in a larger attack and enter Charleroi.

Major Rohr, who commanded it, abandoned the village and retreated with Battalion I of the Prussian VI Regiment to a pre-arranged position behind the Gilly. Although the battalion was pursued by Pajol's cavalry, Rohr successfully withdrew.

The French had completely captured Charlerio and both banks of the Sambre. Reille's Corps was also crossing the river at Marchienne-au-Pont. The right wing of the French Army, commanded by Gerard, had not yet reached its destination at Chatelet because it had a longer march to make than the other armies.

Prussians Continue to Retreat

Brigade IV (Donnersmarck's) of I Corps (Zieten's), which was also the forward column of III Corps, continued its withdrawal towards Fleurus. General Jagow, commanding the latter, had left two Silesian rifle companies and a battalion of the Prussian VII Regiment at Farciennes and Tamines to observe the French movement along the Sambre and to protect the left flank of the position at Glly. However, the French occupation of the left bank of Charleroi and Sambre made the situation of Brigade I (Steinmetz's) critical.

Action in Gosselies

Colonel Rüchel-Kleist learned that General Röder (commanding the I Corps cavalry) had sent the Prussian VI Uhlans Regiment to Gosselies. Rüchel-Kleist reinforced the garrison with Battalion II of the 29th Regiment. Rüchel placed the Uhlans' commander, Lieutenant Colonel Lützow, in charge of the garrison and ordered him to hold the town while he himself stood in reserve with the other two battalions.

As soon as the French were sufficiently reinforced at Charleroi, Napoleon ordered Pajol to detach Brigade I (General Clary's) towards Gosselies and move with the rest of I Corps' cavalry towards Gilly. General Clary reached Jumet on the left of the Brussels road with the French I cavalry and was about a mile from Gosselies before the Prussian I Brigade (Steinmetz's) crossed the Pieton. Pajol advanced to attack Gosselies, but was repulsed by Lieutenant Colonel Lützow's cavalry. This small victory gave Steinmetz time to cross the Pieton. Once past Gosselies, he moved to join Colonel Rüchel-Klesit.

This pressure on General Clay led to the support of Lieutenant General Lefebvre-Desnouettes. A regiment of the Young Guard Division (Lieutenant General Duhesme's) advanced between Charleroi and Gosselies as Lefebvre-Desnouettes' reserve. The advance guard of II Corps (Reille's), which had crossed the Sambre at Marchienne-au-Pont, also advanced directly towards Gosselies to cut off the retreat of Zieten's troops along the Brussels road and to separate the Prussians from the British army. The French I Corps (d'Erlon's), which was well behind, was ordered to follow and support Reille.

Action in Heppignies

As General Steinmetz approached Gosselies, he realized that he was strong enough to cut the French off completely. He immediately directed the II Battalion of the I Westphalian Landwehr to march against the French left flank in order to draw French attention to himself and check the French advance. It successfully continued its retreat towards Heppignies. Steinmetz, protected by the VI Lancers and the I Silesian Cavalry, continued to advance with the rest of Reille along the road to Brussels, reaching Heppignies with almost no casualties, although the II Corps was pursued by General Girard at the head of the French VII Division.

Heppignies was already occupied by the IInd and IIIrd Battalions of the Prussian XIIth Regiment, and with this increase in strength Steinmetz redeployed his men. When Girard attempted to force it after previously occupying Bensart, Steinmetz advanced and drove him back towards Gosselies. Artillery fire continued for a long time to cover the Prussian retreat towards Fleurus.

Action in Gilly

In accordance with Zieten's orders, General Pirch II was forced to abandon Charleroi and, gathering the II Brigade, retreated to Gilly. Pirch took up a favorable position behind the stream, with the Abbey of Soleilmont on his right and the Chatelet Bridge on his left. Gerard's Corps had not yet arrived.

Pirch placed the Fusilier Battalion of the VI Regiment in a forest ahead. To support them, he placed four guns on the right on an elevation overlooking the valley ahead, two guns between this point and the Fleurus road, and two guns to intercept columns trying to advance towards Gilly. The battalion's sharpshooters provided cover for the artillery.

Battalions I and II of Regiment VI formed the reserve units. The I West Prussian Cavalry was positioned on the slope of the ridge facing towards the Chatelet. Here they patrolled as well as communicating with the III Brigade at Farciennes.

General Pirch realized that if the French managed to turn right, they could advance rapidly along the Fleurns road and seriously jeopardize the retreat to Lambusart. To prevent this, he decided to block this road with an embankment.

Vandamme did not reach Charleroi until the same hour that he and Grouchy received orders to pursue the Prussians along the Fleurus. Their advance was delayed because the entire III Corps (Vandamme's) had to cross the Sambre by a single bridge, and both generals were deceived by exaggerated reports of Prussian strength behind the Fleurus Forest. Grouchy went forward for reconnaissance and then returned to ask Napoleon for further instructions. Napoleon then completed his reconnaissance with his own scouts. When he concluded that the Prussian forces consisted of 18 to 20 thousand men, he gave the order to attack.

The French generals made their preparations from a windmill near the Grand Drieu Farm and opened fire at around 18:00. Three infantry columns advanced in echelon from the right. The first was the VI: VI Regiment into the woods occupied by the Prussian Fusiliers Battalion. The second passed to the right of Glly. The third went around the left of this village. The attack was supported by two brigades of the II Cavalry Corps (Exelmans), Burthe and Bonemains. One headed towards Chatelet, threatening the Prussian left flank, while the other advanced along the Fleurus road.

While the battery of the Prussian II Brigade was responding to the French artillery, the light troops were already engaged when General Pirch received Zieten's orders to avoid combat against the outnumbered troops and retreat to Fleurus via Lambusart.

Realizing that the French were advancing in overwhelming force, Pirch quickly put his orders into action and made his preparations accordingly. The Prussian infantry withstood repeated attacks by the French cavalry. Although most of the Prussian forces managed to capture the Fleurus Forest, the Fusiliers Battalion of the 28th Regiment (a company of which was captured on the right bank of the Sambre) was routed. They were ordered to retreat to the Tricheheve Forest behind the hamlet of Rondchamp, northeast of Pironchamps, but were attacked by the French Imperial Cavalry before the move could be completed.

The Fusiler Battalion of the Sixth Regiment was more fortunate. It was attacked by French cavalry about 500 meters from the woods, but managed to repel the charge and get away. In this fight, French General Letort was wounded and died. Some western historians believe that if Letort had been present at Waterloo, he could have changed the course of the war.

The Brandenburg Cavalry (Watzdorf's) had been detached by Zieten to support Brigade II and took the opportunity to reach the battlefield and make several charges on the repulsed French cavalry.

The II Brigade now occupied a position in front of Lambusart, occupied by some battalions of the III Brigade (Jagow). General Röder joined this brigade with the remaining three cavalry regiments and a battery of horse artillery. Mutual artillery exchanges brought events to an end.

Prussian Withdrawal Completed

Prussian Brigade I (Steinmetz's) completed its safe retreat from Heppignies to Fleurus, reaching Saint-Amand around 23:00. The detachments left at Farciennes and Tamines by the III Brigade (Jagow's), like the II Brigade (Pirch's), made an uneventful withdrawal from Lambusart by Wanfercee-Baulet to Fleurus.

By 03:00, I Corps (Zieten's) had established a line of outposts almost 65 kilometers long, starting at Innant on the Meuse River, crossing the Sambre at Thuin and extending beyond Binche to Bonne-Esperance. The main force occupied the Sambre from Thuin to its confluence with the Meuse. Between these two points it covered an area of 58 kilometers, excluding the bends of the river.

From dawn, the Prussians of the I Corps were constantly pursued and engaged by French cavalry. It was only at around 23:00 that I Corps managed to take up a position between Ligny and Saint-Amand, between 23km and 32km from the original outpost line. It accomplished the difficult task it had been given, stopping the advance of the entire French Army North as best the disorganized forces could, and buying enough time for the entire Prussian Corps to assemble the following day.

Gathering of the Prussian Army

By 15:00 on June 15, II Corps (Pirch'in) had taken its assigned position between Onoz and Mazy, in the immediate vicinity of Sombreffe. However, the VII Brigade, deployed furthest from the areas occupied by II Corps, did not reach Namur until midnight. There it received an order to remain in Namur until the arrival of III Corps (Thielemann's). But since this had already happened, the brigade rested for a few hours, then resumed its march and joined II Corps at Sombreffe around 10:00 on June 16.

Thielemann spent the night in Namur, which he occupied with the X Brigade. The IXth Tuagy on the right and the XIth Brigade on the left of Belgrade bivouacked in a village on the road to Sombreffe, a short distance from Namur.

Wrong Order to Bülow

At 05:00 on June 15, Bülow in Liege received orders that the Corps was to move as soon as they had breakfast. The orders had been received for a few hours when, at around 12:00, another order arrived changing the Corps' destination. Knowing the effect this change of destination would have on the troops and knowing that new orders would not arrive for some time, Bülow postponed the move until dawn on June 16.

The dispatch did not ask him to establish his headquarters at Hannut, but stated that Hannut was the best place for the purpose. Bülow was also unaware of the hostilities that would precede the battle. Moreover, the entire Prussian army had good reason to gather in Hannut.

Bülow reported to Blücher's headquarters that he had been delayed in carrying out his new orders and would be at Hannut at 12:00 on June 16. Captain Below, a member of Bülow's staff, carried this message and arrived in Namur at 21:00 on June 15, where he learned that the army headquarters had been transferred to Sombreffe.

At 11:30 a.m. on June 15, another message from Namur to Bülow reported the French advance and requested that IV Corps, after resting at Hannut, march towards Gembloux at dawn on June 16 at the latest.

However, since Bülow's Corps had not yet marched to Hannut, the orders could no longer be carried out. It was therefore impossible for the Prussian IV Corps to take part in the Battle of Ligny, which could have changed the outcome of the battle.

Late in the evening of June 15, after Blücher had established his headquarters at Sombreffe, Captain Below arrived with a report from Bülow and Blücher realized that the IV Corps would not join him the next day.

Prussian deployments on June 15-16 were as follows;

Only one of Blücher's four corps, I Corps (Zieten's), assembled at the chosen position at Ligny on the night of June 15/16. The others were;

• II Corps (I. Pirch's), coming from Namur, was encamped between Onoz and Mazy, about 10 kilometers from Ligny.

• III Corps (Thielmann's) spent the night in Namur, about 25 kilometers from Ligny.

• Corps IV (Bülow's), which Blücher thought was in Hannut at the time, was still in Liege, about 100 kilometers from Ligny.

Anglo-Allied Engagements

First News from Quatre Bras

On the far left of the Duke of Wellington's army was the II Dutch Division (Perponcher's) on the Charelero-Brussels road. The II Brigade of this division (Colonel Goedecke's) was positioned as follows.

• Battalion I of the II Nassau Regiment (Büsgen's) at Houtain-le-Val

• II Battalion (Normann's) at Frasnes-lez-Gosselies and Villers-Perwin

• III Battalion (Hechmann's) at Baisy-Thy, Quatre Bras and Sart-Dames-Avelines

• Two battalions of the XXVIIIth Regiment of Orange-Nassau (Prince Bernard's) at Genappe

• Frasnes also had a Dutch horse artillery battery under the command of Captain Byleveld.

Early in the morning of June 15, unaware of the French advance, these troops heard rapid artillery fire from a distance in the direction of Charleroi. However, they had received no warning of the French advance and concluded that the firing was a Prussian exercise they had heard often and were used to.

As noon approached, however, the cannonade grew louder and in the afternoon a wounded Prussian soldier arrived to report that the French were advancing. A messenger immediately sent this information to regimental headquarters and from there to Perponcher's headquarters at Niveles. Perponcher immediately ordered Brigade I of his division (General Bylandt's) to advance towards Nivelles and Brigade II (Goedecke's) towards Quatre Bras.

Meanwhile, Major Normann, commanding the II Battalion of the Nassau II Regiment, deployed his battalion with the battery behind Frasnes on the Quatre Bras road. He also placed a watchtower beyond the village.

Start of Direct Conflicts

At about 18:00, French troops of the Piraeus Light Cavalry Division of the Reille Corps appeared in front of Frasnes and soon drove in Major Normann's picket. This officer placed a company on the south or French side of Frasnes in order to delay the French entry into the village as long as possible. Byleveld's battery was positioned on the north side of the village and the rest of the companies of the II Battalion of the Nassau II Regiment rallied to support it. Two guns were on the road and three on each side of the road.

After a while the French lancers were reinforced and Normann's company was forced to retreat through the village. The Prussians then succeeded in driving the French cavalry back with a fierce fire. The French then turned on the Prussian left flank, but Major Normann and Captain Byleveld retreated towards Quatre Bras.

Nassau Rations at Quatre Bras

Before Perponcher's order reached the II Brigade (Geodecke's), Prince Bernhard of Saxe-Weimar, commanding the Orange-Nassau regiment at Genappe, received intelligence from the Dutch-Belgian Marechaussees officer that the French were advancing. Prince Bernhard took it upon himself to advance with his regiment from Genappe towards Quatre Bras and sent a report of his movement to the brigade headquarters at Houtain-le-Val. He then sent a similar report to Perponcher at Nivelles.

Quatre Bras was the meeting point of the II Brigade (Goedecke's) and the III Battalion of the II Regiment of Nassau. The II Regiment was stationed in the immediate vicinity of Quatre Bras. When Prince Bernhard arrived at Quatre Bras with the Orange-Nassau Regiment, he learned of the fighting at Frasnes and assumed command.

Realizing the importance of ensuring that the main road from Charleroi to Brussels joined the road from Namur to Nivelles, Prince Bernhard decided to take a strong defensive position at Quatre Bras. This decision was in line with the essence of the new orders sent at the time from the Dutch-Belgian headquarters at Braine-le-Comte.

General de Perponcher, who commanded the division, confirmed the Prince's determination. Colonel Goerecke, the commander of the II Brigade at Hautain-le-Val, had a broken leg and handed over command to Prince Bernhard, who accepted immediately.

The Prince moved the III Battalion of Nassau's II Regiment towards Frasnes. He detached two companies of the I Battalion and the Volunteer Jagers for the defense of the Bossu forest and sent the rest of the companies towards Hautain-le-Val. He deployed the rest of the brigade at Quatre Bras along the road to Namur. Byleveld's mounted battery had four guns in the direction of Frasnes, two on the Namur road and two in the rear of the main body.

Ney Joins the Great Army

Marshal Ney joined Napoleon at 19:00 on June 15 near Charleroi, at the point where the Fleurus road joined the road to Brussels. Napoleon handed over command of Corps I and II to Ney and announced that Reille was advancing with three divisions towards Gosselies and that d'Erlon would spend the night at Marchienne-au-Pont. He also told Ney that he would put Piraeus' light cavalry division at his disposal, as well as two regiments of Chasseur and Lancer, which he would use only as a reserve.

A determined defense by Prince Bernhard's forces, coupled with heavy artillery fire and the threat of a possible attack by the Dutch occupying Bossu Forest, forced Piraeus' advance guard to retreat. Having retreated without being attacked, Piraeus also provided Ney with the exaggerated information that Quatre Bras was occupied by ten battalions.

Movements of the Ney

Here is how Ney's forces are organized in the evening:

• Piraeus' Light Cavalry Division and Bachelu's Oiyade Division occupied Frasnes-lez-Gosselies, about 3 kilometers south of Quatre Bras on the road to Brussels. Two regiments of Chasseurs and the Guards Lancers were waiting behind Frasnes.

• Reill's two divisions and their attached artillery were at Gosselies. These divisions maintained communications until the arrival of d'Erion's Corps, which remained overnight at Marchienne-au-Pont.

• The remaining division of Reille's Corps was at Heppignies, thus maintaining communication with the main column under Napoleon's command.

Because the movement had taken so long, there was great fatigue in the army. The strength of the armies and the names of the commanders were also unknown to Ney. Also unknown was the number of troops that could reach and gather at the end of the day.

This, combined with the information from Quatre Bras, meant that Ney did not risk an attack and contented himself with taking up a position at a point beyond Frasnes-lez-Gosselies.

Movements of Other French Troops

The position of the center of the French army was as follows:

• III Corps (Vandamme's) was encamped in the Fleurus Forest.

• The light cavalry of the I Cavalry Reserve Corps (Pajol's) was based at Lambusart.

• The III Light Cavalry Division (Domon's) was positioned on the left, at the exit of the forest, between the heavy cavalry of the II Cavalry Corps and the III Corps.

• The VI Corps (Lobau's) was behind Charleroi with the heavy cavalry of the IV Cavalry Corps (Milhaud's).

Wellington's First News and Orders

The Duke of Wellington's first report of the start of hostilities on June 15 was transmitted by General Zieten at dawn and reached Brussels only at 09:00. This report, however, did not give Wellington a clear idea that the French were planning a real attack in that area. It only stated that Prussian outposts in front of Charleroi were engaged in fighting. This could have been a prelude to a real attack, or it could have been a diversion for an attack in another direction.

Prince William of Orange arrived in Brussels after midday and informed Wellington that the Prussian outposts had been attacked and were forced to retreat. In the early hours of the morning, the Prince left Braine-le-Comte for the front, where he had a meeting with General van Merlen. After this meeting, he went to Brussels to convey the information he had obtained to Wellington.

Wellington did not consider the Prince's information sufficient to take action, but Prussian General von Müffling, attached to the British headquarters, gave Wellington a message from Blücher that the French had attacked the Prussian positions at Sambre and were advancing towards Charleroi.

Reports from outposts, especially from the King's German Legion's First Cavalry, stationed around Mons and Tournai, told him that Napoleon was concentrating his forces. Wellington, on the other hand, was determined not to move until a decisive line of attack had been established, and so he held his positions firmly in place. At the same time, Wellington ordered his troops to be ready and sent a report to Major General Dörnberg, asking him to inform him of any French movement in the direction of Mons.

Informing the Prince of Orange

It was evening when the first intelligence about the French attack in the direction of Frasnes reached the Prince of Orange's headquarters at Braine-le-Comte. Lieutenant Webster (the Prince of Orange's aide-de-camp) left for Brussels shortly afterwards with a report from de Constant Rebecque, the Dutch Quartermaster-General, describing what had happened and detailing the measures he considered appropriate. These measures did not coincide with the instructions Wellington had given that day. Because Wellington was not aware of the Frasnes attack.

The French advance along the Charlero road had been successfully checked at Quatre Bras and Wellington had issued a new order to the troops he had ordered to assemble at Nivelles that night to assemble there immediately.

Explanations of Napoleon's Operations

In the opinion of the historian William Siborne, the results on June 15 were extremely satisfactory for Napoleon. The crossing of the Sambre had been completely accomplished. With the main part of his forces he marched directly towards the assembly point previously agreed upon by Blücher's army. Another part of his army was advancing on the highway to Brussels. And Napoleon had advanced so far along this line. Even the unification of the coalition armies was too risky a move. This gave Napoleon the chance to concentrate his main firepower on the other army while keeping some of the Coalition armies at bay.

William Siborne argued that no matter how good the plan of operations looked in theory, in the end there were other circumstances that jeopardized the outcome for the French. Napoleon's troops had been under arms, marching and fighting continuously since 02:00. They therefore needed time to rest and regenerate. They were spread over a large area around Sambe. Ney's forces were in detached units from Frasnes to Marchienne au Pont, the location of d'Erlon's corps. Vandamme's corps and the Imperial Guard had stopped at Charleroi. Therefore, by the first light of dawn on June 16, the entire French army would converge at a closer position. This window of time was valuable for the Coalition generals because it gave them enough time to plan to neutralize Napoleon.

Given that the Prussians had not yet assembled at Ligny before dawn on June 16. If Napoleon's commanders had realized this, the Prussian armies could have been destroyed before they assembled, or Wellington could have been distracted from his army and turned to other enemies. William Siborne contrasts the relative laxity of Napoleon's orders to Ney with the energetic determination and relatively restless activity that characterized his most critical operations in previous wars, and concludes that this largely explains the French failure of the campaign.

By contrast, Napoleon did not advance on Fleurus until 11:30 on June 16. By this time, the Prussian I Corps (Zieten's), II Corps (Pirch II) and III Corps (Thielemann's) were assembled and in position. Ney, however, was delayed by the subordination of his operations to Napoleon's and did not advance in any way against Wellington's forces until 14:30. Meanwhile, Wellington's reserves reached Quatre Bras from Brussels and joined the forces that had participated in the Battle of Quatre Bras.

Battle of Quatre Bras

Prelude

Faced with two armies (Wellington from the west and the Prussians under von Blüher from the east), Napoleon's overall strategy was to defeat each in turn before these forces could unite. Napoleon planned to cross the border into what is now Belgium without informing the Coalition leaders and drive a wedge between their forces. He planned to defeat the Prussian army and force it to retreat eastward, then engage Wellington and drive his army back to the English Channel.

Napoleon realized that if Wellington's British allied army could unite with the Prussians, it would be larger than the French army. The crossroads at Quatre Bras therefore became a strategic location. For if the French held this crossroads, they could prevent Welligton's forces from advancing southeast along the Nivelles-Namur road towards the Prussians, where Napoleon planned to engage von Blücher at Ligny on June 16.

Although Wellington's instructions at the start of the campaign were to defend Brussels against the French, he was unsure which route Napoleon's army would take. He had also received (albeit false) reports of a flanking maneuver to the southwest through Mons. Wellington first received word of the start of hostilities from the Prince of Orange, one of the Coalition commanders, at around 3:00 p.m. on June 15. Over the next few hours, he received additional reports that the French had engaged Prussian I Corps under Lieutenant General Graf von Zieten at Thuin earlier that morning. This news prompted Wellington to prepare the first orders to assemble his army at 18:00. But he was still unsure exactly where to concentrate his forces, and when he learned that the front near Mons was open, it was almost midnight before he ordered his army to advance on the Prussians.

This nine-hour delay meant that it was too late for him to send sufficient forces to support von Blücher at the Battle of Ligny on June 16. Wellington did not order his entire army to march to Quatre Bras on June 16. This was because he was still suspicious of a move through Mons. However, the headquarters of the British-allied I Corps (of the Prince of Orange) decided to ignore Wellington's order to assemble in and around Nivelles and instead took the initiative to approach Quatre Bras.

Napoleon's original plan on June 16th was based on the assumption that the Coalition forces, caught unprepared, would not make a risky attempt to mass forward. He therefore planned to advance a vanguard as far as Gembloux in order to sense and fend off von Blücher. To assist this operation, reinforcements would first move to Fleurus to reinforce Marshal Grouchy, who was tasked with pushing back the Prussian troops. However, after the French had captured Sombreffe, Napoleon planned to shift the support westward to join Marshal Ney, who he believed would have secured the Quatre Bras junction by then.

Accordingly, Marshal Ney, to whom the III Cavalry Corps (Kellermann's) was attached, was to assemble at Quatre Bras and advance a vanguard 10 kilometers north from there, sending a connecting division to Marbais to link up with Grouchy. Together, the center and the left wing would make a night march towards Brussels. Thus the Coalition forces would be forcibly separated and it would be left to destroy each of them in detail. Napoleon now awaited information from his wing commanders in Charleroi. Here he had massed VI Corps to save it from a harassing counterattack if possible. It followed that this Corps would only be needed in the event of an attack on Brussels.

On June 15, as the Prussian I Corps withdrew towards Ligny, there was a danger to the Coalition forces that Ney could advance from Quatre Bras and seize their objectives without the Coalition having to resist. At I Corps headquarters in Genappe, Major General Jean Victor de Constant Rebecque, chief of staff to the Prince of Orange, recognized the danger and ordered Lieutenant General Hendrik George de Perponcher Sedlnitsky, commander of the II Dutch Division, to send his II Brigade to occupy Quatre Bras. This brigade of two regiments arrived from Nassau at about 14:00 on June 15. Prince Bernhard was able to deploy before the arrival of the first French pickets approaching Quatre Bras, the lancers of the Guards Light Cavalry Division.

After these French lancers clashed at Frasnes, the Nassauers retreated to the Bois de Bossu, a dense patch of forest near Quatre Bras. General Lefebvre-Desnouette requested infantry support, but as it was night and all the infantry were lined up on the Brussels-Charleroi road, Ney refused. Instead, he decided to camp for the night and approach Quatre Bras the next day. On the evening of 15 June, instead of obeying Wellington's order to concentrate I Corps at Nivelles (which would have meant the force occupying Quatre Bras abandoning the position), Rebecque ordered I Brigade of the II Dutch Division (van Bylandt's brigade) to reinforce Prince Bernhard's II Brigade.

Rebecque, against a direct order from Wellington and using his own initiative, was responsible for the battle at Quatre Bras the following day, thus preventing the French from separating the two coalition armies and destroying each in detail.

Ney spent the morning of June 16 massing his I and II Corps and scouting the enemy at Quatre Bras, which he was informed had been reinforced. It was not until noon, however, that he took any serious steps to annex the crossroads, which he could have done with relative ease. Meanwhile, Grouchy reported from Fleurus that the Prussians were arriving from Namur. Napoleon, however, does not seem to have paid much attention to this report. He was still in Charleroi between 09:00 and 10:00 when news reached him that enemy forces were gathering at Quatre Bras. He immediately wrote to Ney telling him that these could only be some of Wellington's troops, that Ney should concentrate his forces and crush those in front of him, and that Ney should send all reports to Fleurus. Napoleon then left Marshal Lobau's forces temporarily in Charleroi and arrived at Fleurus at around 11:00 am.

Meeting at the Bussy Windmill

Shortly after 11:00 Wellington observed that the French were not in a large force at Frasnes. At the same time, he received reports that the Prussians entrenched at Ligny were threatened by the advance of a considerable French force. Wellington, accompanied by his staff and a small contingent of cavalry, set out for a meeting with von Blücher, whom he met at the Bussy Windmill between Ligny and Brye. As this windmill was at the highest point of the Prussian positions, the leaders could observe the French preparatory deployments before the attack.

These observations led Wellington to conclude that Napoleon was driving the main force of his army against the Prussians. He immediately proposed to help von Blücher and, as soon as he had sufficient forces, to advance first towards Frasnes and Gosselies, then to attack the French on their left and rear, thus providing a powerful diversion to help the Prussians. This was because von Blücher's right flank was the weakest and most vulnerable and, given Napoleon's movements, the most likely to be attacked.

Primary sources disagree about what was discussed at the meeting. They all agree that Wellington promised to help Blücher, but they disagree on whether Wellington made an explicit promise of help, or whether Wellington made it clear that he could only help Blücher in time if his forces did not engage before sending help.

Battle

The fighting began on the afternoon of June 15, when the Elba company, a small Polish lance company of only 109 soldiers and officers, attempted to attack the Allied forces in the direction of Frasnes. These forces consisted of the II Nassau regiment and the Bijlevelds horse artillery. However, the Dutch and Nassau commanders had taken precautions and the lancers were met with artillery and volleys. They lost some men and horses before retreating to Frasnes. Patrols were sent out to hold the positions until the next day.

From 5 a.m. on June 16, there was continuous fighting between the Allied and French forces, with neither side gaining the advantage. Some Prussian cavalry, detached from their main body, engaged the Red Lancers. However, they broke off after Bijleveld's artillery once again drove the lancers back. Two companies of Nassau infantry advanced towards Frasnes, but this time the French drove them back. Sometime after 6 a.m., the fighting stopped when the Prince of Orange arrived.

The actual battle began around 14:00 with the firing of Ney's 22-gun battery. As the French columns attacked, they were preceded by swarms of skirmishers. The Dutch II Division's (Sedlnitsky's) picket line greeted them with rifle fire, but they retreated when French troops east of the Brussels highway were also encountered. The Nassauers of Brigade II retreated to the farm of Grand-Pierreponrt and the Dutch troops of Brigade I to Gemioncourt, but the Allies still managed to hold the forest. Faced with three infantry divisions and a cavalry brigade, the situation was becoming hopeless for the II Division, which was relieved at around 3:00 p.m. by the arrival of the V British Infantry Division (Picton's) and the III Dutch Light Cavalry Brigade (Baron von Merlen's). After Wellington returned from his meeting with Blücher and took command, Picton's division deployed on the Allied left flank and halted the French advance east of the road. With the arrival of the newly arrived French VIth Division (Prince Jerome Bonaparte), the fighting intensified. The French VI Division was sent against Grand-Pierrepont, while Picton defended his front with great tenacity. The Nassauers were forced to abandon the farm and were driven into the Bossu forest. Here they slowed the French advance to some extent. At Gemioncourt, Dutch troops were giving the French great difficulties.

The V National Militia Battalion defending Gemincourt Farm lost much of its original strength that day. It was repulsed by the IV Light and 100th Line regiments, but regrouped north of the farm with the 28th British Infantry coming to their aid. However, while this regiment thought that the farmhouse had been lost and retreated, the Vth Militia, thinking that they would receive reinforcements, attacked the farmhouse again and drove the French regiments from the perimeter of the farm. The Vth managed to take up positions south of the farmhouse and were joined by their Prince. With artillery support, they drove back the VIth Chasseurs-Au-Cheval and a regiment of lancers. Although the Dutch lost and retook the farm, they ultimately lost the farm.

At 15:00 the French formed a line from Pierrepont to Gemioncourt to Piraumont. At 15:30 the Dutch II Light Cavalry Brigade (Van Merlen's), led by the Prince of Orange, attacked the French line, but were repulsed by the French cavalry. Although this attack was unsuccessful, it bought time for the exhausted Dutch infantry to regroup. When the Dutch Cavalry Brigade broke off and retreated to friendly lines, they were shot by Scottish infantry because their uniforms resembled those of the French chasseur a cheval. The Brunswick Corps, commanded by the Duke of Brunswick, was now in the field. But the attack failed after their commander was wounded in an attack. Around 16:15, Ney received Napoleon's order to attack in force and sent an order to his II Corps (Honore Reille's) to attack with more forces.

On Ney'im's left, Prince Jerome drove the Allies out of Bossu Forest. French mixed forces advanced to the crossroads. Regiments of the British IXth Brigade held out against the 42nd, 44th and 92nd infantry. The timely arrival of the British III Division (Alten's) from Nivelles at 17:00 shifted the numerical balance in favor of the Allies. As the clock ticked past a quarter of an hour, Ney heard that the French I Corps (d'Erlon) was moving eastward to assist in the Battle of Ligny without his knowledge or orders. Shortly afterwards, d received a vague order from Napoleon to capture Quatre Bras and then turn east to crush Blücher, who had been captured at Ligny. With the arrival of Allied reinforcements, Ney realized that he could only capture and hold Quatre Bras with the support of I Corps and sent d'erlon imperative orders to return immediately. To keep the pressure on Wellington, immediately after sending d'Erlon, Ney ordered Kallermann to lead the only cuirassier brigade he had and break through Wellington's line.

Kellermann's cavalry caught the British V Brigade in line formation and the skirmish resulted in the V Brigade losing the king's standard. The remnants escaped a similar fate by fleeing into Bossu Forest. The cavalry reached the crossroads but were driven back by artillery and rifle fire.

The arrival of the British I Infantry Division gave Wellington enough strength for a counterattack and Jerome, whose skirmishers were now west of Quatre Bras, was forced to retreat and cede control of Bossu Wood to the British Guards. When the Guards and other allied troops emerged from the woods, they were met with heavy fire from French infantry and an attack by the VIth Lancer Regiment of the II Cavalry Division. This attack and the capture of Bossu Wood caused high casualties among the British Guards. There were a few more skirmishes between the Allied troops and the French voltigeurs, but the battle was over. When the fighting stopped at 21:00, the French were forced to give up all territorial gains.

Consequences of the Battle of Quatre Bras

The battle cost Ney 4,000 men to Wellington's 4,800. Although the Allies won the field, the French prevented the Prussians from coming to their aid at the Battle of Ligny. Wellington's British allied army, after learning of the Prussian defeat, was forced to retreat north along the road to Brussels and northeast towards Wavre. Napoleon chose to pursue Wellington and met him two days later at Waterloo.

The allied victory at Quatre Bras prevented Ney from controlling these strategic crossroads. This slowed the French advance and allowed Wellington to take up positions on the Waterloo battlefields that would not otherwise have been possible.

After the Waterloo campaign, Wellington was given the title of Prince of Waterloo by King William I of the Netherlands. Along with the title, he was also given the lands covering the Quatre Bras battlefield. As a landowner, the Duke and his successors cut down a large part of the Bossu Forest for timber.

Battlefield of Waterloo

The Waterloo position chosen by Wellington was a strong one. It consisted of a long ridge running east-west, perpendicular to and bisected by the main road to Brussels. Along the top of the ridge ran the road to Ohaion, which was in a deep ditch. Near the junction with the Brussels road was a large tree in the center of Wellington's position, which served as a command post for most of the day. Wellington deployed his infantry on a line just behind the crest of the ridge following the Ohain road.

Using the reverse slope as he had done before, Wellington concealed his strength from the French, except for his skirmishers and artillery. The frontage of the battlefield was about 4 kilometers long. This allowed Wellington to place his forces deep in the center and on the right as far as the village of Braine-l'Alleud, in the expectation that the Prussians would reinforce his left during the day.

In front of the ridge, there were three positions that could be fortified. On the far right was Hougoumont's chateau, garden and orchard. This was a large and well-built country house. The house faced north along a covered road through which supplies could be made. To the far left was the hamlet of Papelotte.

Both Hougoumont and Papelotte were fortified and garrisoned, thus securely anchoring Wellington's flanks. Papelotte also commanded the Wavre road, which the Prussians would use to send reinforcements to Wellington's positions. On the west side of the main road and in front of the rest of Wellington's line was La Haye Sainte Farmhouse and orchard, where 400 light infantry from the King's German Legion were stationed. On the opposite side of the road was a disused sand quarry where the 95th Rifles were posted as snipers.

The position of Wellington's forces posed a formidable challenge to any attacking force. Any attempt to turn Wellington's right would require the capture of the Hougoumont position. Any attack on the right center meant that the attackers would have to advance between the fire from Hougoumont and La Haye Sainte. Any attack on the left would also be flanked by fire from La Haye Sainte and the adjacent sand quarry, and any attempt to turn its left flank would require fighting through the roads and hedgerows surrounding Papeloote and other garrison buildings on that flank, and on some wet ground at the Smohain turnoff.

The French army was concentrated on the slopes of another ridge to the south. Napoleon could not see Wellington's positions. He therefore arranged his forces symmetrically around the Brussels road. On the right was Corps I under d'Erlon, with 16,000 infantry and 1,500 cavalry and a cavalry reserve of 4,700 men. On the left was II Corps under Reille with 13,000 infantry, 1,300 cavalry and 4,600 cavalry reserves. In the center, on the road south of the La Belle Alliance inn, was Lobau's VI Corps of 6,000 men, 13,000 infantry of the Imperial Guard and a cavalry reserve of 2,000 men.

To the right rear of the French positions was the important village of Placenoit and to the far right the forest of the Bois de Paris. Napoleon initially led the battle from his Rossomme farm, from where he could see the entire battlefield, but later moved to a position near La Belli Alliance. Command on the battlefield was transferred to Ney.

Preparing for War

Wellington had previously written to Blücher that he would fight at Mont-Saint-Jean if Blücher provided him with at least one corps, otherwise he would retreat towards Brussels. At a late-night meeting, Blücher's chief of staff, August Neidhardt von Gneisenau, distrusted Wellington's strategy, but Blücher convinced him that they should march to join Wellington's army. In the morning Wellignton received a reply from Blücher promising to support him with three corps.

From early in the morning Wellington was on the field, overseeing the deployment of forces. At Wavre, the Prussian IV Corps, under Bülow, was in good shape, having not participated in the Battle of Ligny, and had been assigned to lead the march to Waterloo. Another task of the IV Corps was to ensure that the other three corps returned from the battlefield of Ligny.

The roads were in bad condition because of the overnight rain and Bülow's men had to move along the narrow roads of Wavre. On top of this, a fire in Wavre made things even more difficult. As a result, the last part of the corps did not set out until six hours after the vanguard had left for Waterloo.

According to a conversation his brother Jerome overheard among British officers at the King of Spain inn in Genappe, he received information that the Prussians were marching from Wavre. After relaying the information to Napoleon, Napoleon thought that the Prussians would need at least two days to regroup. Surprisingly, aside from the rumors Jerome had overheard, the French commanders at the pre-battle conference at Le Caillou had no knowledge of the alarming proximity of the Prussians and did not suspect that Blücher's troops would soon be on the battlefield in large numbers.

Napoleon had delayed the start of the battle because of the muddy ground, which would make it difficult for cavalry and artillery to maneuver. In addition, most of his forces were encamped south of La Belle Alliance. In the early hours of the morning, he sent a message to Grouchy, telling him to head for Wavre and then to intercept the Prussians so that they could reach Waterloo as soon as possible.

At noon, Napoleon prepared his general order. Accordingly, Reille's Corps on the left and d'Erlon's Corps on the right were to attack the village of Mont-Saint-Jean and follow each other. This order was given because Napoleon assumed that Wellington's battle line was in the village and not further forward on the ridge. In order to fulfill this order, Jerome's division was to make a first attack on Hougoumont, and Napoleon hoped that with the loss of Hougoumont he could draw Wellington's reserves, as it would threaten communications with the sea. A large battery of reserve artillery from the I, VI and VI Corps was to bombard Wellington's position from 13:00. d'Erlon's Corps was then to attack Wellington's left. Napoleon wrote in his memoirs that his main aim was to separate Wellington's army from the Prussians and drive it towards the sea.

The Battle at Hougoumont Farm

Wellington wrote in his notes that at about 10:00 Napoleon launched a fierce attack on his positions at Hougoumont. The first attack by Pierre François Bauduin's brigade cleared the woods and park, but was repulsed by heavy British artillery fire. This first attack cost Bauduin his life. While the British guns were distracted by French artillery, a second attack by Soye's brigade and Bauduin's brigade managed to reach the north gate of the house. A French officer, Sous-Lieutenant Legros, broke the door down, allowing French troops to enter the courtyard. The Coldstream Guards and Scots Guards quickly arrived to support the defense. After a struggle, the gate was closed again and all the French who remained inside were destroyed.

Fighting around Hougoumont continued all afternoon. The perimeter was surrounded by French infantry and attacks were made against the troops behind Hougoumont. Wellington's army defended the house and the ditch road that ran north of the house. Napoleon then personally ordered the bombardment of the house. This resulted in the destruction of everything except the chapel. Du PLat's brigade of the King's German Legion was brought forward to defend the ditch road. They were eventually relieved by the 71st Highlanders, a British infantry regiment. Adam's brigade was reinforced by Hugh Halkett's III Hanoverian Brigade and successfully repelled infantry and cavalry attacks sent by Reille.

Although the fighting at Hougoumont was intended to draw Wellington's reserves, it turned into an all-day battle, which in turn drew French reserves. In fact, both Napoleon and Wellington had good reason to believe that holding Hougoumont was the key to winning the battle. Hougoumont gave Napoleon a clear view of the battlefield. He therefore continued to direct his resources to it and its surroundings throughout the day. Similarly, although there were never many soldiers at home, Wellington dedicated 21 battalions here to keeping the pit road open to allow new troops and ammunition to reach the buildings. After the battle, it became clear that Hougoumont was in fact a key point.

In the afternoon, Napoleon saw the first Prussian troops near the village of Lasne-Chapelle-Saint-Lambert, about 7 km from the right flank of his army. Napoleon's first move was to issue an order to Marshal Soult telling Grouch to come to the battlefield immediately. But Grouchy was too far away from the battlefield to carry out Napoleon's other order, to follow the Prussians towards Wavre.

Although Grouchy was advised by his subordinate Gerard to move towards the sound of gunfire, Grouchy remained loyal to the order and fought the rearguard of the Prussian III Corps under Lieutenant General Baron von Thielmann at the Battle of Wavre. In addition, a letter from Soult with Napoleon's orders reached Grouchy only in the evening.

First Attack by French Infantry

In the afternoon the attack of the I Corps began in great columns. Cornwell wrote of this attack: “Although its narrow end suggests a long formation pointed like a spear at the enemy's line, in reality it was more like a brick moving sideways, and d'Erlon's attack consisted of four 'bricks', each of which was a French infantry division.

The only exception was Division I. Its two brigades were formed in a similar way, but they were lined up side by side instead of one behind the other. This was because it was located to the left of the four divisions.

The leftmost division advanced towards La Haye Sainte, a walled farmhouse. This farmhouse was guarded by the King's German Legion. One French battalion attacked the defenders from the front, while the other battalions spread out on either side and managed to surround the house with the cavalry. But try as the French might, they could not outflank the Germans. As soon as the Prince of Orange saw that La Haye Saint was cut off, Hanocerian sent the Lüenburg Battalion forward to reinforce it.

D'Erlon then ordered his other three divisions to advance against Wellington's left flank on a front of about a kilometer. The first line they faced consisted of Brigade I of the II Dutch Division, surrounded by Kempt and Pack's British brigades. The second line consisted of British and Hanoverian troops under Sir Thomas Picton, hiding in the terrain behind the ridge. But all of these had suffered major wounds at Quatre Bras. In addition, the skirmishers in Bylandt's brigade were ordered to take up positions on the ditch road. The rest of the brigade was just behind the road. As soon as these skirmishers joined their main battalion, the brigade was ordered to its feet and returned fire.

D'Erlon's troops climbed the slope and advanced along the Chemin d'Ohain, a ditch road that started behind La Haye Sainte and continued eastward. Bylandt's brigade was just across the road, with the British brigades about 100 meters back, Pack's troops on Bylandt's left and Kempt's on Bylandt's right. Kempt engaged Quiot's division, while in the center Donzelot's division managed to push Bylandt's brigade back.

The French advance drew the British skirmishers in and reached the pit road. When they did, Pack's men stood up and opened fire. But the French infantry had anticipated an attack and moved in a linear formation. This allowed the British to return fire in a regular pattern and were pinned down. Although the advance in the center had stalled, the line on the right was broken. Picton ordered a counterattack but was killed shortly afterwards. British and Hanoverian troops then began to retreat.

In the fighting that ensued, the British troops retreated while at the same time breaking up their line. This situation signaled that Napoleon would win the Battle of Waterloo. According to the reports of Baron von Müffling, the Prussian liaison officer to Wellington's army, the Duke's situation would become critical if the Prussian army's help was delayed.

British Heavy Cavalry Charge

In this critical situation, Uxbridge ordered two British heavy cavalry brigades, formed invisibly behind the ridge, to charge to support the embattled infantry. It is also important to note that the long years of warfare on the European continent had led to a decline in cavalry mounts. The great advantage of the British cavalry was that they were not present in these battles, but came to war with full and real cavalry mounts. It is said that on the morning of the battle of Uxbridge, their commander was told that he might not receive direct orders and that in some cases he would have to take the initiative and support the unit in front of him. The disorganization of the cavalry protecting D'Erlon's left flank gave the British the advantage and they won a small victory here.

Continuing their attack, the British then destroyed Aulard's brigade. The advancing British crossed La Haye Sainte and found themselves facing Schmitz's square brigade.

On their left, the Union Brigade suddenly dived into the infantry lines. In the center, the Royal cavalry captured the eagle of Napoleon's 105th Line Regiment and destroyed Bourgeois' brigade. Inniskilling routed the other brigade of Quoit's division and the Scottish Greys followed the British infantry across the trench road and into the still recovering 45th Ligne Regiment.

As with the Household Cavalry, Royalist and Inniskillings officers struggled to organize their disorganized troops. Taking casualties and still struggling to regroup, the Scottish Greys found themselves in front of the main French lines. Some of them attacked the nearby artillery batteries of the Grande Battery (French artillery). Although the Greys did not have the time or means to neutralize or move the guns, they were neutralized as many of the gun crews escaped.

Napoleon immediately responded by ordering a counterattack by Farine and Travers' cuirassier brigades and two lance regiments of Jaquinot's light cavalry division of the I Corps. Scattered at the bottom of the valley between Hougoumont and La Belle Alliance, the Scottish Greys and the rest of the British heavy cavalry were caught unawares by the counterattack of Milhaud's cuirassiers, joined by lancers from Baron Jaquinot's I Cavalry Division.

As Ponsonby tried to rally his troops against the French battleships, he was attacked by Jaquinot's lancers and taken prisoner. A nearby Scottish contingent saw that he was captured and made a move to rescue him, but they failed.

With Ponsonby's death, the momentum swung completely in favor of the French. Milhaud and Jaquinot's cavalry drove the Union Brigade out of the valley. A counter-attack by British light cavalry under Major General Vandeleur, Dutch-Belgian light cavalry under Major General Ghigny on the left flank and Dutch-Belgian troops under Major General Trip in the center succeeded in driving the French back.

The Union Brigade suffered heavy casualties in terms of both officers and men lost and wounded. The Heraldic Brigade's Life Guards II and the King's Dragon Guards also suffered heavy losses. However, the I Life Guards on the far right of the attack and the Blues, who formed the reserve, maintained their cohesion and suffered relatively few casualties. Close engagements with the French cavalry, carbine fire and, most dangerously, artillery fire, steadily reduced the number of men in the brigade, and in the process the entire brigade could only muster three companies, but even these lost some of their numbers in the face of the French cavalry.

Although the French attacked with large numbers of troops led by d'Erlon, the I Corps was eventually defeated and pushed back from the valley. In addition, the loss of so many troops prolonged the time for the army to regroup and considerable time was lost. As the Prussians began to appear on the battlefield, Napoleon ordered Lobau's VI Corps to move towards the Prussians before d'Erlon's next attack began.

French Cavalry Attack

As the clock approached dusk, Ney noticed a marked retreat from Wellington's center. He mistook the movement of casualties to the rear for the beginning of a retreat and intended to take advantage of it. After the defeat of D'Erlon's Corps, Ney had few infantry left. This was because most of the infantry had been sent either to the attack on Hougoumont or to the defense of the French army's right. Ney therefore tried to break Wellington's center with his cavalry alone. Initially, he deployed Milhaud's reserve cavalry and Lefebvre-Desnoettes' light cavalry division of the Imperial Guard. When these were repulsed, Kellermann's heavy cavalry and Guyot's heavy cavalry were added to the attack. Napoleon, however, considered this offensive too early.

Wellington's infantry responded by lining up in a square formation. The side of a square was no more than 18-20 meters long. Squares of infantry standing in place were deadly for cavalry. Mounted troops could not charge this square formation because the cavalry, caught in the middle, was surrounded on all sides. Wellington also ordered his artillery to move into the squares as the cavalry approached. As the cavalry retreated, the artillery returned to their positions and continued firing.

In essence, this kind of cavalry attack relied entirely on shock to be effective. The cooperation of artillery and cavalry would have been useful in disrupting these square formations, but there was no such cooperation among the French. French artillery fire could have been very useful if used correctly, but it was mostly long-range fire. In the end, the French attack was successfully repulsed by the infantry holding their formation, harassing fire from the British artillery and support from the Dutch cavalry brigade.

It remains unclear why the French artillery did not hit the British, while Wellington's artillery was constantly on fire. Exhausted after numerous attacks on the Mont-Saint-Jean ridges, the French cavalry retreated. Four division commanders and nine brigade commanders were wounded and one killed, although the exact casualties are unknown.

Second Attack by French Infantry

In the end, it became clear that cavalry alone, even for Ney, was not much of a force. He belatedly launched a combined attack, using the French cavalry that was able to fight alongside Bachelu's division and Tissot's regiment of Foy's division from Reille's II Corps. This attack was made along the same route as the other attacks, Hougoumont and La Haye Sainte. Although the attack was stopped by the cavalry of the Heraldic Brigade led by Uxbridge, they were forced to retreat by the rifle fire of the French infantry.

Uxbridge wrote that he tried to direct the Dutch Carabiniers under Major General Trip to renew the attack, but they refused to follow him. He also claimed that the British cavalry took the same view of this event. However, there is no support for this in Dutch or Belgian sources. Likewise, Wellington wrote to Bathurst, the Minister of War, on June 19, 1815, that General Trip had behaved to his satisfaction. Uxbridge then ordered a new charge with the III Cavalry of the King's German Legion. Although the French lines were broken by the order, they were unable to advance and suffered heavy casualties.

Although the French cavalry did not inflict many direct casualties on Wellington's center, the artillery fire against the infantry was effective. Wellington's cavalry, with the exception of the leftmost brigades of Sir John Vandeleur and Sir Hussey Vivian, all took part in the battle and suffered heavy losses. The situation became so dire that the only available Hanoverian cavalry regiment, the Cumberland Hussars, retreated towards Brussels.

French Capture of La Haye Sainte

At the same time as Ney's attack to the right of Wellington's line, elements of D'Erlon's I Corps, led by the XIIIth Legere Regiment, repeated the attack on La Haye Sainte and this time succeeded, partly because the King's German Legion ran out of ammunition. But the Germans held the center of the battlefield for the entire day, halting the French advance.

With the capture of La Haye Sainte, Ney moved skirmishers and mounted artillery towards the center of Wellington. The firing of the French artillery gave them the upper hand. This was the success Napoleon needed to advance.

In addition to this artillery fire, a large number of French tirailleurs (light infantry units) occupied the dominant positions behind La Haye Sainte. As the firing slowed, Wellington approached with his staff. The sudden appearance of French skirmishers brought them under sudden fire. The Prince of Orange then ordered the V Battalion, the only battalion of the King's Alma Legion, to attack the farm again, despite the presence of the enemy. Moving down the slope, V Battalion broke through the French cavalry and forced them to retreat.

A Dutch-Belgian cavalry regiment ordered to charge was forced to retreat under fire. Merlen's Light Cavalry Brigade also charged the French artillery positioned near La Haye Sainte, but was scattered by fire. Wellington's last cavalry reserve, the Dutch Cavalry Division, had lost half its strength, while the French, despite their losses, still had the advantage. This led to more French artillery being brought forward. At the same time, the French Tirailleur division's fire from the commanding heights almost destroyed the Inniskilling Infantry.

Arrival of the Prussian IV Corps

The Prussian IV Corps (Bülow's) was the first to arrive in force. Bülow's objective was Plancenoit, which the Prussians planned to use as a lunge point to the rear of the French positions. Blücher intended to use the Bois De Paris road to secure the right of the Château Frichermont.

Around the same time, the Prussian XVth Brigade (Losthin's) was sent to link up with the Nassauers on Wellington's left flank in the Frichermont-La Haie area, with the brigade's horse artillery battery and additional brigade artillery deployed on the left in support. Napoleon sent Lobau's Corps to stop the rest of Bülow's IV Corps from advancing on Placenoit. But the XVth Brigade drove Lobau's corps out of Frichermont and then advanced towards Plancenoit, breaking through the French Chasseur Corps with artillery fire. This prompted Lobau's Corps to retreat back towards the Plancenoit area.

Napoleon sent eight battalions of the Young Guard (the elite unit within Napoleon's Imperial Guard) to reinforce Lobau, which was now under serious pressure. Although the Young Guard's attack was successful, they were forced to retreat after a counterattack. Napoleon then sent the Middle/Senior Guard (two other groups, also part of the Imperial Guard) to Plancenoit. This force was sufficient to capture the village.

Zieten's March

In the afternoon, Prussian I Corps (Zieten's) began to arrive in strength in the area just north of La Haie. Zieten had by this time brought up the Prussian I Brigade (Steinmetz's) but became concerned when he saw desertions and casualties from the Nassau troops on Wellington's left and the Prussian XV Brigade (Laurens's). These troops seemed to be retreating. Zieten feared that his own troops were also retreating, so he began to move away from Wellington's flank and towards the Prussian main body near Plancenoit. Zieten had also received a direct order from Blücher to support Bülow, and to carry out this order he moved to Bülow's aid.

It was after this move that Müffing persuaded Zieten to support Wellington's left flank. Zieten's arrival prevented the collapse of Wellington's left flank. The Franks, expecting Grouchy's reinforcements from Wavre, were bitterly disappointed to see Zieten's army. By the evening Zieten's attacks had pushed the Prussian army lines to Hougoumont, Plancenoit and La Haie.

Durutte launched successful attacks and captured the positions of La Haie and Papelotte, but was forced to retreat before he could withstand the Prussian 24th Regiment. The French, who had initially responded strongly, now made a major stand to recapture Smohain and to defend the ridge of Papelotte and the few remaining houses.

The Prussian 24th Regiment, combined with the Scottish battalion on its far right and supported by the XIIIth Landwehr Regiment, drove the French out. Attacks by the XIIIth LAndwehr and the XV Brigade also drove the French from Frichermont. Dururtte's division was also forced to withdraw from the battle by the artillery fire of Zieten's army. In the west, the French Central Guard attacked Wellington's center, while d'Erlon's army withdrew from the battle. The Prussian army then moved towards the Brussels road, the only French escape route.

Attack of the Imperial Guard

Meanwhile, with Wellington's center exposed by the fall of La Haye Sainte and the Plancenoit front temporarily stabilized, Napoleon deployed his last reserve, the hitherto undefeated Imperial Guard. The aim of this attack, launched around 20:00, was to break through Wellington's center and drive the Prussians from the line. The initial deployment of the Middle and Old Guard was supervised by Napoleon himself. The Middle Guard was organized in a square. The I and III Grenadiers under Generals Friant and Poret de Morvan were on the right along the road, with General Harlet and the IV Grenadiers to their left and rear, followed by the I and III Chasseurs under General Michel and finally the IV Chasseurs under General Henrion. The horse artillery of the Guard was accompanied in two parts. The whole army was led by Marshal Ney. At the rear were the three battalions of the Old Guard, from right to left the I and II Grenadiers, the II Chasseurs and the I and II Chasseurs. Ney, who led the attack, instead of moving the Middle Guard towards the center, directed it towards the right flank where the British allies were. Napoleon sent Ney's aide, Colonel Crabbe, to order Ney to correct this, but Crabbe did not arrive in time.

Other troops rallied to support the advance of the Guards. On the left, infantry and cavalry from Reille's corps not engaged with Hougoumont advanced. On the right d'Erlon's corps, which had managed to rally, advanced. French artillery also advanced in support. Here, Duchand's battery in particular had a clear advantage over Colin Halkett's brigade. Halkett's front line engaged the Grenadiers regiment but was forced to withdraw. It was here that Halkett was shot in the face and ordered the withdrawal of the entire regiment. Along with Halkett, the other British troops withdrew. The remnants of Nassauers and Kielmansegge's brigades and the British then combined to attack again, but were repulsed by the French. Meanwhile, the survivors of Halkett's brigade regrouped and engaged the French.

On his own initiative, Chasse, the Dutch division commander, decided to advance with the Dutch division, which was still fresh compared to the others. The horse artillery battery, led by Captain Krahmer de Bichin, moved first and made a relatively successful attack against the I and III Grenadiers. But it was still unable to stop the advance of the Guards. Chasse then ordered his first brigade, commanded by Colonel Hendrik Detmers, to charge the French with bayonets. Chasse himself took part in this battle among the soldiers. After this attack, the Grenadiers faltered and had to retreat.

To the left of the IV Grenadiers, to the west, were the battalions of the I, II and III Chasseurs. But as they advanced they realized that the hill was deserted. But there was also the British Infantry Guard under the command of Peregrine Maitland, hiding from French artillery fire. After this surprise encounter, the British Infantry Guards came out of hiding and launched a surprise attack on the French. Although the French tried to return fire, Colonel Mallet and General Michel lost their lives in this sudden raid. The British Infantry Guards were then replaced by the 52nd Light Infantry under the command of John Colborne and completely dispersed the French.

With the retreat of the Guards, panic reigned in the French lines. Wellington ordered his army to attack. The surviving Imperial Guard rallied its three reserve battalions just south of La Haye Sainte for a last stand. An attack by Adam's Brigade and the Hanoverian Landwehr Osnabrück Battalion, as well as the relatively fresh cavalry brigades of Vivan and Vandeleur, threw the French into confusion. The remnants retreated back towards La Belle Alliance and some were given the opportunity to surrender. This opportunity to surrender gave rise to the famous saying “La Garde meurt, elle ne se rend pas!” (The Guard dies, it does not surrender).

Prussian Capture of Plancenoit

Around the same time, the Prussian V, XIV and XVI Brigades began their advance towards Plancenoit. Five Guards battalions were deployed to support the Young Guard, along with the remnants of Lobau's Corps. From the Chantelet Woods, the real key to the Plancenoit position, Pirch's II Corps arrived with two brigades and advanced through the woods, reinforcing IV Corps' attack.

The musketeer battalions of the XXV Regiment drove the Old Guard out of the Chanteler Woods, forcing them to retreat. When the Prussian IV Corps advanced beyond Plancenoit, it encountered the French, who were retreating in disorder from the British pursuit. The French were surrounded and destroyed. Almost all of the French Young Guard Division and two-thirds of Lobau's Corps were destroyed.

French Disintegration

The right, left and center of the French army had now completely collapsed. The last coherent French force consisted of two battalions of the Old Guard stationed around La Belle Alliance. This battalion acted as a last reserve and was tasked with protecting Napoleon in the event of a French withdrawal. The French army's hope was to rally behind the last remaining battalion of the Old Guard. But when the retreat turned into a rout, they too were forced to retreat, on either side of La Belle Alliance, as cover against the Coalition cavalry.Napoleon commanded the left flank of the army until he was convinced that the battle was lost. Adam's brigade attacked here and drove the French back.

In the evening both sides retreated, but the French cannon and much else fell into the hands of the Prussian and English armies. The Prussian army continued to harass the retreating French troops late into the night. Napoleon's abandoned carriage was also captured here. The jewels found in the carriage became the crown jewels of King Friedrich Wilhelm of Prussia.

Results

Waterloo cost Wellington around 17,000 men and Blücher 7,000. The XVIIIth Regiment of Bülow's XVV Brigade fought at both Frichermont and Plancenoit and won 33 Iron Crosses. Napoleon's losses amounted to 25,000 men, 6,000 prisoners and other deserters.

In the early morning hours of June 19, General Grouchy, following orders, defeated General Thielemann at Wavre and successfully withdrew 33,000 French troops who had never reached the battlefield of Waterloo. Wellington sent his official account of the battle to England on June 19, 1815. On June 22, it was published in the London Gazette Extraordinary. Wellington, Blücher and other Coalition forces advanced towards Paris.

After the withdrawal of the troops, Napoleon fled to Paris and sent a letter to his brother and regent Joseph in Paris in which he believed that he could still muster an army to fight against the Anglo-Prussian forces. Indeed, Napoleon believed that he could still muster an army and stop the Prussian forces until General Grouchy's army arrived in Paris. However, after Napoleon's defeat at Waterloo, both the French public and Marshal Ney had lost confidence in Napoleon. Napoleon's brother Lucien and Marshal Louis-Nicolas Davout advised him to continue fighting, to dissolve the constitutional government of Louis XVIII, the Chamber of Deputies, and to rule France as a military dictatorship, as he had done before. But when Napoleon realized that he lacked military, popular and governmental support for his claim to continue ruling France, he asked to abdicate in favor of his son Napoleon II. But this request was also quickly rejected by the legislature.

On June 24, 1815, Napoleon announced his intention to abdicate for the second time. In the final battle of the Napoleonic Wars, Napoleon's Minister of War, Marshal Davout, was defeated by Blücher at Issy on July 3, 1815. According to one claim, Napoleon first tried to escape to North America. But the Royal Navy blockaded French ports to prevent such a move. He finally surrendered to Captain Frederick Maitland of HMS Bellerophon on July 15. Louis was eventually restored to the French throne and Napoleon was exiled to the island of Saint Helena, where he died in 1821. The Treaty of Paris was signed on November 20, 1815.

References

• "Napoleonic Satires", Brown University Library, (https://library.brown.edu/cds/napoleon/time7.html) (Son erişim 05.02.2025)

  
  

• Chesney, Charles C. (1874), Waterloo Lectures: A Study Of The Campaign Of 1815. (https://archive.org/details/waterloolectures00ches/page/n11/mode/2up) (Son erişim 05.02.2025)

  
  

• Creasy, Sir Edward (1877), The Fifteen Decisive Battles of the World: from Marathon to Waterloo. (https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/4061) (Son erişim 05.02.2025)

  
  

• Booth, John (1815), The Battle of Waterloo: Containing the Accounts Published by Authority, British and Foreign, and Other Relevant Documents, with Circumstantial Details, Previous and After the Battle, from a Variety of Authentic and Original Sources, (https://books.google.com.tr/books?id=9IIBAAAAYAAJ&redir_esc=y) (Son erişim 05.02.2025)

  
  

• Haweis, James Walter (1908), The campaign of 1815, chiefly in Flanders. (https://archive.org/details/cu31924024320891/page/n11/mode/2up) (Son erişim 05.02.2025)